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The September  10, 2001  edition  of Time 
magazine dedicated its cover story  to Colin 
Powell and his “megastar  wattage … curiously 
dimmed”  inside of the Bush  administration. 
Of course, no one knew  that at that precise 
moment all the human and technological 
components for  the worst  attack  ever 
committed on  United States soil were already 
in place,  and imminent danger  existed. 
Discussing  General Powell’s role inside the 
White House was a  good cover  story  for 
September 10th.
Then  came the attacks of September 11, 
2001 – 9/11.
The catastrophic  event  occurred without 
warning.  The attacks seemed like a  random 
and unpredictable occurrence; a  black hole in 
our cognition.
But  obviously,  9/11  was a  complicated 
event  that  required the use of many  previous 
steps,  many  technologies in  concert, and 
many  brains working  together  to achieve that 
particular  end.  What  we saw  that day  was 
o n l y  o n e m o r e s t e p ( n o t  e v e n  t h e 
culmination) of a  very  long  series of 
converging  processes – a  deviant  result  of the 
innovation  process that  also fuels progress 
inside our technologically  dependent 
civilization. 
On September 12,  2001  a still  perplexed 
world asked how  was it  possible that the 
terrorists’ attacks were not stopped; all the 
clues were there, the dots were waiting  to be 
connected and al Qaeda  had already  been 
active and recognized as a  threat  by  the 
federal government since the 1990s.
On September 14, 2001  Time  had a new 
cover. It  featured a  collapsing World Trade 
Center  – an  avalanche of dust,  steel and 
glass.
But  if 9/11  was just  the visible part  of a 
longer process, were did it all start?
T h e h i s t o r i c a c c o u n t o f t h e 9 / 1 1 
Commission Report finds the roots of 9/11  in 
the rise of a  national resistance against  the 
communist  government of Afghanistan in 
1978, which  would eventually  lead to the 
formation of al Qaeda 1.
I argue that  the patterns that  lead to 9/11 
are much older,  but at  the same time they  are 
considerably  less linear.  Therefore,  that 
direct line that  the 9/11 Commission Report 
traced is nothing  more than  an  illusion 
produced by  what Nassim  Taleb  calls the 
retrospective distortion, “or  how  we can 
assess matters only  after  the fact, as if they 
were in a  rearview  mirror  (history  seems 
clearer  and more organized [linear]  in  history 
books than in empirical reality).” 2 
This retrospective distortion creates a 
security  ecosystem  where homeland security 
practitioners feel  pressured to try  to “connect 
the dots”  every  time, instead of adapting to 
an  environment  of emerging patterns and 
mutating dots that cannot be connected. 
Moreover, certain  technologies have been 
doubling  in  capacity  every  few  months for 
many  years now  and, as a  consequence, 
technology  improvement cycles have also 
shrunk. We have grown  used to having  a  new 
and improved version  of a  product that  is 
twice as powerful in  just a  few  months,  and 
radical disruptive propositions every  year  or 
two.  Because of technological  convergence,  it 
is very  hard to predict  what  unintended 
consequences all  those improvements and 
new  technologies will have once they  are 
r e c o m b i n e d w i t h  o t h e r s ,  a n d w h a t 
catastrophic  possibilities convergence might 
have that  we will miss on  the next  9/10.  This 
is the chaotic  security  environment where 
homeland security  operates today. For  the 
next ten  years, homeland security  should 
embrace it. 
9/11/1973: WHY NOT?  
Romance languages, as well  as German, have 
introduced the neologism  of “uchronia”  (from 
uchronie in  French)  in their  vocabularies to 
define the subgenre in  fiction  where reality  as 
we know  it  is profoundly  altered by  a  change 
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in  the chain  of events.  They  describe a time 
that  does not exist, or  a non-time.  In  an 
uchronic  novel, reality  it is indistinguishable 
to ours until an  event  – often called a  “point 
of divergence”  or  a  “Jonbar  Hinge”  – triggers 
a  ser ies o f second and th i rd leve l 
consequences that end up creating a  reality 
that  it  is almost  unrecognizable from  ours, 
even though initial conditions were identical.
In  Turtledove’s novel How  Few  Remain, 
the south  won  the American Civil  War 
because of an  accidental  recovery  of a 
document; in  The Man in the High Castle,  by 
Phillip K.  Dick, a  successful assassination 
plot against  President  Roosevelt  creates an 
environment  that ends up being favorable to 
the axis powers,  who end up winning  World 
War II.
Uchronias make interesting  readings (or 
movies, although  some people have trouble 
enjoying  the convoluted plots of time paradox 
films) because they  describe contextual 
patterns that we all  recognize  and are 
familiar  with. Then,  after  a  fictional  “point  of 
divergence”,  second and third degree 
consequences create a  believable new 
environment  that  is almost unrecognizable 
from  reality  as we know  it,  but  that  we can 
accept as a  plausible “what if.”  Uchronias 
confront  us with  the fragility  of reality  and 
the power  of the randomized and chaotic 
forces that  surround us.  They  contradict  the 
linear  nature of historic events; show  us how 
precarious and fluid are “the dots”  that  have 
to be connected, and how  organic  is the 
nature of any  threat.  If the briefcase bomb 
would have been  a  little  to the left (or  to the 
right… who knows?),  Hitler  would have died; 
if one of many  things described in  the 9/11 
Commission Report would have happened 
(or  not  happened) on  9/10, we would have 
continued the discussion  about  Collin  Powell 
on 9/12.
The innovation  cycle is “pushing” Jonbar 
Hinges on  society  faster  than  ever  before. 
Each  new  or  improved technology  adds a  new 
series of combinatorial possibilities that  can 
shape society  in  unpredictable ways.  Many 
technologies today  are nothing other  than 
backbones designed to support spontaneous 
innovation  – touch screen  blank slates for 
others to design  their  apps, in an  emerging 
cycle that feeds on itself.
Millions of people potentially  empowered 
by  those backbone technologies mean 
millions of potential innovators all thinking 
and doing  things that  have not  been  thought 
or done before. 
But  those innovations do not  happen  in  a 
vacuum. Instead, as Brian Arthur explains: 
New technologies in  time become possible 
components – building blocks  – for  the 
construction  of further new technologies. 
Some of  these in turn  go on  to become 
possible building  blocks of  yet  newer 
technologies. In  this  way, slowly, over time, 
many  technologies form  from  an initial  few, 
and more complex  ones  form using simpler 
ones as components. The overall  collection 
of technologies  bootstraps itself  upward 
from  the few to the many and from the 
simple to the complex. We can say that 
technology creates itself out of itself. 3
Ideas – or  memes, as evolutionists like to 
call  them  – evolve from  the simple to the 
complex.  They  progress in the sense that 
whatever  was there before will be constantly 
improved and recombined with  new  thoughts 
and ideas making  something better  that can 
then  be used again to continue this incessant 
process. 
Unfortunately,  innovation  has a  dark side. 
The same accelerated combinatorial 
evolution  that  empowers entrepreneurs to 
rapidly  improve our high  tech  environment 
can, and often is, used to harm the innocent. 
In  fact,  I believe 9/11  was the product of 
thousands of years of innovation in a  radical, 
deadly, and novel way. 
T h e i n n o v a t i v e r e c o m b i n a t i o n  o f 
technology  that made those terrorist  attacks 
possible took  advantage not  only  of the 
knowledge and imagination of Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed and Osama  Bin  Laden, but  also 
of Minory  Yamasaki (the WTC architect); the 
ingenuity  of the Wright brothers and all the 
aviation  heroes who made flying  machines a 
reality; the hundreds of engineers from 
Boeing; and, in  general,  thousands of years of 
accumulated human  knowledge (material 
engineering,  tube frame design,  Le Corbusier 
modernist philosophy, and thousands more 
innovations, all the way  back to the wheel, 
language and the invention of tools!).  
In  Uchronia,  9/11/2001  could have 
occurred on  9/11/1973, just  a  few  months 
after  the ribbon  cutting  ceremony  of the 
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World Trade Center.  By  that  time,  jumbo jets 
were flying,  the Pentagon  had been  built,  and 
most of the technology  that  was materially 
used during 9/11  existed, ready  to be 
recombined in  order  to achieve a  catastrophic 
result. 
But  if the technology  already  existed in 
1973,  the “9/11  idea”  did not. Creativity  does 
not evolve following  a  linear  path  of dots and 
many  things had to happen  for  this complex 
adaptive environment to evolve towards a 
state where 9/11  went  from  being  a  possibility 
that  lurked in  the dark since 1973,  to a  sad 
meme of human innovation 4. 
That  is the paradox.  We can  easily  imagine 
“planes as weapons”  as the 9/11 Commission 
Report asked. The meme requires the 
recombination  of just  a  few  previously  known 
ideas: suicide militants,  planes, volatile  jet 
fuel, and skyscrapers.  But the same thing can 
be said for  Facebook  (it  is not  hard today  to 
imagine an  interconnected personal 
database),  Amazon  (an  online-only  retail 
store), or Netflix  (a mail-based rental  model 
that  combined the backbone of the postal 
service with  the Internet). Yes,  we can 
imagine all  that,  but someone imagined it 
first,  recombined technologies and created 
huge companies out  of it.  We can  all  imagine 
an  iPad,  but  Steve Jobs and the rest  of the 
Apple designers imagined and successfully 
implemented it first.
Innovation  is innovation  not because it  is 
impossible to think  of something,  but 
because no one else thought of it before. 
WE DON’T REINVENT THE WHEEL – WE 
APPROPRIATE IT!
Ted Lewis identified the importance of 
“stigmergy”  in  the invention-innovation 
cycle: “invention  [works] as the stimulus and 
innovation  as the response.  After  each  cycle, 
the stimulus-response pattern repeats.” 5
I agree with  him  that “stigmergic”  behavior 
is one of the patterns that  govern  the 
c o m b i n a t o r i a l e vo l u t i o n  p r o c e s s o f 
i n n o v a t i o n  a n d t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
environment.  Lewis establ ished the 
reciprocal  need inventors and innovators 
have for  each other  in  a  stimulus-response 
cycle  loop, but  I believe that  there is a third 
key  actor  in  the invention-innovation cycle: 
the adopter  of the technology.  Inventors, 
innovators,  and adopters stimulate each 
other.  Although  most adopters will be fairly 
passive actors,  some will  adapt the 
technology  to be used as something  that 
neither  the inventor  nor  the innovator 
thought it  could be used for,  in  a  process that 
Dix refers to as appropriation.6
I am  convinced that  all innovators are also 
active appropriators – they  appropriate 
existing technologies for  their  new  designs, 
using them in unanticipated ways.
For  example,  the designers of the Chevy 
Volt did not have to reinvent the wheel or 
velour  interiors. On the other  hand, I am  sure 
that  the inventors of the wheel  or  the so-
called “faux  velvet”  did not  envision  an 
electric car  as one of the applications of their 
technological innovations (none of them 
knew  what  electricity  or  cars would be!). 
Progressive innovation  requires the 
appropriation  of previous technologies to be 
used differently  from  what  the original 
designer anticipated. 
W h e n a  c l a n d e s t i n e a c t o r  u s e s 
infrastructure to do harm, he or  she illicitly 
appropriates the  technology  to achieve a  goal 
different from  what  the designers intended. 
In  the online world, we give the name of 
hacking  to that behavior. In the real world, 
terrorists hack our  high  tech society  every 
time they  are successful and the acceleration 
of technological development provides the 
illicit  appropriator  more building blocks and 
more possibilities to combine them  every  day. 
Combinatorial evolution creates unforeseen 
convergence that gives to the inventor-
innovator-appropriator  cycle more uchronic 
choices. 
Terrorism  is a  technological artifact that 
results from  the appropriation  of systems 
through  combinatorial evolution. Forecasting 
every  possible innovation in  this context is 
impossible.
Consequently, while it  seems like an  easy 
challenge to imagine planes as weapons (in 
fact  Tom  Clancy  wrote an  almost  uchronic 
novel out of this exact  idea),  Taleb reminds 
us “had the risk  been  reasonably  conceivable 
on  September 10, it  should not  have 
happened. If such  a  possibility  were deemed 
worthy  of attention, fighter planes would 
have circled the sky  above the twin towers, 
airplanes would have had locked bulletproof 
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doors, and the attack would not have taken 
p lace ,  per iod .”  He then cont inues : 
“something else might  have taken place. 
What? I don’t know.”7 
At this precise point, I am  sure, many 
patterns are forming  that  will  create 
appropriation  opportunities in  the future, 
and some of them  will be harmful.  Which 
ones will turn  out to be relevant? I don’t 
know either.
In  this complex adaptive environment  of 
accelerated high  tech  innovation,  the 
“connect-the-dots”  game seems to be the 
worst possible metaphor. If one has to be 
found,  I would like to offer  an “Encrypted 
letter  soup”  as a  replacement, where all the 
relevant  information  of a  catastrophic event 
becomes relevant  only  after  the pattern has 
been recognized. That is, after the fact.
In  this pr imordia l le t ter  soup of 
catastrophes, the proverbial  dots to be 
connected are encrypted in noise.  Worse, 
because there is no preconceived pattern,  the 
“dots”  evolve and change in  randomized 
ways, until one day they acquire meaning. 
Connecting  every  dot  is called paranoia. In 
the case of nation  states,  institutional 
paranoia  is quite often  the foundation  of 
totalitarian  regimes that  thrive in  the waters 
of the politics of fear.
We cannot anticipate all innovations, and 
imagination  understood as anticipatory 
forecasting of new  threats cannot  be 
bureaucratized. 
CONCLUSION: HOMELAND 
SECURITY: THE EARLY ADOPTER 
DISCIPLINE
Combinatorial evolution  of technology  does 
not have to favor  the illicit  appropriator.  This 
randomized environment created by  the 
accelerated pace of technology  cycles will 
favor  those who can  produce more ideas,  and 
ride the wave of uncertainty  instead of 
opposing it.
While  studying  the origins of the so-called 
geniuses,  Dean Simonton  found that  “The 
more ideas a  mind can  produce,  the higher 
the odds that those ideas will be original and 
varied…. Flexibility  and originality  are both 
to a  very  large extent mere consequences of 
fluency.” 
His research  conclusively  demonstrated 
that:
The creative process is to a  certain  extent 
blind. Even  the greatest creators possess no 
direct and secure path  to truth or  beauty. 
They  cannot guarantee that every  published 
idea  will  survive further evaluation and 
testing  at the hands  of audiences or 
colleagues. The best  the creative genius can 
do is  to be as prolific as possible in 
generating products in the hope that at 
least some subset will  survive the test of 
time. 8
The homeland security  effort  for  the next 
ten  years must  encourage public  and private 
inventors,  innovators,  and appropriators of 
new  disruptive security  ideas to be prolific 
and then  aggregate those efforts.  This would 
allow  us to surpass – by  a  few  orders of 
magnitude – the number of disruptive ideas 
produced by the clandestine actors. 
In  the next  ten  years, the Department of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) should embrace 
and become the early  adopter  of almost  all 
new  technologies,  appropriating  them, 
generating  knowledge about  them,  and 
proactively  thinking how  to recombine them 
with  other building blocks in  order  to make 
civilization more resilient. 
Ten  years from  now, DHS must  be the gold 
standard of usability  labs in  order  to 
understand, appropriate, and improve as 
many new technologies as possible. 
We cannot control  the complex  adaptive 
environment  of technological evolution  nor 
should we try, as positive innovation  requires 
– in  Schumpeter’s words – creative 
destruction  and chaos.9 Nevertheless, we can 
control  the government’s own pace of 
innovation, and its rate  of technological 
understanding and adoption.
For  the next ten years,  the homeland 
security  community  should become the most 
tech-enthusiastic  community  inside of 
government.  No one – with  the probable 
exception of DARPA  – should be more 
innovative and more “tech  savvy”  regarding 
what  makes technology  usable,  why  people 
use a  particular  technology,  and how  security 
can be improved while also improving 
usability. 
In 2021, homeland security  should be 
perceived as a  project  that  has helped 
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maintain, or  even  accelerated, the pace of the 
innovation  cycle and not the opposite.  A 
project that  has made the backbone of 
American  innovation stronger,  more open  for 
positive appropriation,  and more resilient for 
when  the unavoidable illicit  appropriation 
does take place. 
Homeland security  as a  doctrine should 
embrace combinatorial evolution and plan 
for it. Government projects should be 
innovative,  but  also scalable, so they  can  be 
adapted to the unexpected,  and they  should 
prefer  social to centralized deployment of 
technology.  When  possible,  government 
should prefer  software instead of hardware 
and off-the-shelf to proprietary. It  should 
also design  policy  and infrastructure for 
openness instead of secrecy; there are more 
good people than  bad people, so policies 
should take advantage of this superiority  of 
numbers and aggregate their  knowledge and 
effort.
Homeland Security  technology  and 
strategies (also a  social technology) should be 
easily  upgradable.  If not, many  of them  will 
be will  be legacy  technology  by  the time they 
reach the public. Homeland security  decision 
makers should avoid bloated solutions and 
examine constantly  old security  measures to 
avoid petrifaction. It  might  even  be 
worthwhile to consider  “sunset”  security  laws 
and regulations,  in  order  to permanently 
question  if old security  layers are still  needed 
in  the ever-evolving security  environment 
(we might be able to finally  leave our cell 
phone on  during  take off…as many  iOS users 
already do, without knowing it!10)
Finally,  instead of official futures (we will 
get  them  wrong anyway),  the homeland 
security  planning process should plan  for 
Uchronia  and serendipity. Current scenario 
planning  methodologies are a  good starting 
p o i n t ,  a l t h o u g h  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
practitioners should create their own. 
Technological  evolution  is part  of our 
instinct  to explore.  It is who we are, and it  is 
part  of what makes us better  than  our 
previous selves.  In  2021,  the homeland 
security  project  should be the reason  why  the 
creative backbone of civilization is stronger 
and more resilient,  so the explorers of 
tomorrow  can  perpetuate the very  American 
tradition of thriving  in the unknown, pushing 
the last  frontier  – the knowledge frontier  – 
further, one innovation at a time. 
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